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FAMILY LAW—STATES SHOULD CREATE A HEIGHTENED %
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR CONTRACTS THAT DETERMINE THE
DISPOSITION OF FROZEN EMBRYOS IN CONTESTED DIVORCE CASES %
Stacie L. Provencher*
While in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) presents an opportunity to become
parents for a couple facing infertility or experiencing medical issues that
may ultimately result in infertility, it also presents the possibility for a
legal dispute should the couple separate in the future. The contracts that
the parties enter into with the fertility clinic, and with each other, at the
beginning of the IVF process are long, complicated documents that are
often not well explained nor well understood. Because the parties do not
necessarily understand the rights that they are each giving up under
these contracts or contemplate how forfeiting these rights may affect
each in the future, there can be legal disputes if a couple separates. Since
many states have not addressed embryo disputes at the time of divorce
through legislation, this issue has to be decided by state appellate courts
when the issue arises. In 2018–2019, three state appellate courts were
tasked with determining the correct way to handle the disposition of
embryos as a matter of first impression.
This Note examines the way courts have decided to handle the disposition
of embryos1 in contested divorces. There are three approaches taken
across the country: the contract approach, the balancing of interests
approach, and the contemporaneous mutual consent approach. This
Note considers whether contracts with fertility clinics should be
* Stacie L. Provencher graduated with her Juris Doctor from Western New England
University School of Law in 2020, and her Bachelor of Arts from College of the Holy Cross in
2012. Prior to completing her Juris Doctor, she worked for seven years as a family law paralegal
in Connecticut. The author wishes to thank the entire law review staff for their efforts in
preparing this piece for publication and Dean Patricia Newcombe for her thoughtful input as
faculty advisor.
1. Courts use the terms “embryo” and “pre-embryo” interchangeably to describe the
cryogenically frozen embryos created during the IVF process. For the reader’s ease, this Note
will use the term “embryo” regardless of the phrase a specific state court uses.
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examined by courts more critically than contracts are reviewed
generally. This Note argues that states deciding this issue as a matter of
first impression should move away from blanket enforcement of
contracts. This objective can be accomplished by employing a
heightened standard of contract review before enforcing agreements,
and instead using the balancing of interests approach in the event the
clinic contracts fail to meet this heightened standard in a way that
protects the interests of the parties.

INTRODUCTION
Disputes over frozen embryos are becoming increasingly more
common during divorce proceedings.2 In fact, in 2018 alone, multiple
parties have pending appeals concerning the court-ordered disposition of
frozen embryos pursuant to divorce judgments in state appellate courts
throughout the country.3 This increase in legal disputes over embryo
disposition may be the result of new technology that permits frozen
embryos to remain viable longer and the increased capability of women to
gestationally carry a child at a more advanced age.4 Because of these
technological advances, the number of frozen embryos cryogenically
stored throughout the United States has increased.5 Recent estimates
suggest that there may be more than 620,000 frozen embryos currently
kept in storage.6 Additionally, as a result of medical advances in cancer
treatment, women who have frozen embryos to protect their fertility
potential post-cancer treatment are now living to have the opportunity to
bring those embryos to term.7
Although the vast majority of litigation is resolved before trial, some
complex and heavily contested cases require resolution by way of a trial.8
2. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A
Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 378 (2013).
3. See In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018); Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d
681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019); Bilbao v. Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977 (Conn. 2019).
4. See Grants and Funding, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV.,
https://www.hhs.gov/opa/about-opa/embryo-adoption/grants-and-funding/index.html
[https://perma.cc/V2MW-35VE].
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. See Terrell, 438 P.3d at 684; Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1132–33 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2012).
8. See generally Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years
War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2005). But see Judith G. McMullen & Debra Oswald, Why Do
We Need a Lawyer: An Empirical Study of Divorce Cases, 12 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 57, 66 (2010)
(noting that there are many divorce cases in which litigants are not able to handle their action
pro se given the complexity of the issues).
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If the control of frozen embryos remains unresolved at the time of the
divorce proceeding, the fate of those embryos is then subjected to the
discretion of the courts.9 Because family law is largely state dependent,
each state has the ability to determine its own legal doctrines, although a
state can certainly look to other jurisdictions for persuasive authority.10
Currently, state courts use three different approaches for the purpose of
determining the disposition of frozen embryos: the contract approach,11
the balancing of interests approach,12 and the contemporaneous mutual
consent approach.13 Each approach has strengths and weaknesses.14
However, recent cases highlight problematic aspects of the contract
approach.15 While many state courts generally favor the enforcement of
contracts, the family law forum has provided some exceptions in which
contracts are not enforced unless they include the requirements of an
issue-specific, heightened contract standard.16 Prenuptial agreements,
postnuptial agreements, parenting agreements, adoption contracts, and
surrogacy contracts are all considered using a more critical standard of
review than typical contracts.17
Generally, in a divorce case, there is a dichotomy between persons
and property.18 Courts can enter orders concerning custody of persons

9. Id.
10. Joseph A. Carroll, Family Law Is Not Civil: The Faulty Foundation of the Domestic
Relation Exception to Federal Jurisdiction, 52 FAM. L.Q. 125, 125–26 (2018); see also
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770–71 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“If ever there
were an area in which federal courts should heed the admonition of Justice Holmes that ‘a page
of history is worth a volume of logic,’ it is in the area of domestic relations. This area has been
left to the States from time immemorial, and not without good reason.”).
11. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590–91 (Tenn. 1992).
12. See, e.g., Reber, 42 A.3d at 1134.
13. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See, e.g., Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 697 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019) (Cruz, J.,
dissenting). Ruby Torres did not foresee that her husband would file for divorce and
compromise her ability to have biological children post-cancer. Id. The record suggests that
she would not have engaged in the creation of embryos using her then-fiancé’s sperm if she
could have foreseen this as a potential issue. Id.
16. See Forman, supra note 2, at 395.
17. Gary A. Debele & Susan L. Crockin, Legal Issues Surrounding Embryos and
Gametes: What Family Law Practitioners Need to Know, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 55,
85 (2018); see Forman, supra note 2, at 395.
18. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child
Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 338–39 (2008); Margaret
Ryzner, An Empirical Study of Property Divisions at Divorce, 37 PACE L. REV. 589, 600–02
(2017).
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(children) and the division of property.19 Courts use different standards in
making decisions concerning these different areas.20 Despite the
emotional attachment an individual may have to an embryo to which they
are biologically related, under existing domestic relations law, embryos
are not treated the same as live children,21 and the court lacks the
jurisdiction to enter custody orders.22 Some courts struggle with the
concept of treating embryos as property.23 Overall, most courts treat
embryos as a special category of property—one that is not truly property.24
While parties may not anticipate a future embryo dispute when they
begin the IVF process at a fertility clinic, recent high profile cases are
exposing the complicated nature of these disputes.25 The embryo dispute
between Sofia Vergara and her ex-fiancé26 has garnered national media
attention.27 The Colorado appeal of In re Marriage of Rooks was the
subject of publications on a national level.28 People were upset when they
19. Debele & Crockin, supra note 17, at 75; Kohm, supra note 18, at 338–39; Ryzner,
supra note 18, at 600–02.
20. Kohm, supra note 18, at 338–39; Ryzner, supra note 18, at 600–02.
21. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774–76 (Iowa 2003).
22. Waltenburg v. Waltenburg, 270 S.W.3d 308, 316 (Tex. App. 2008) (discussing that
the requirements in place for the determination of the home state of a minor child make clear
that the intention of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act was not to
address custody of fetuses).
23. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992). In this case the trial court
found that the embryos were persons from the moment of conception and awarded custody to
the wife so she would be permitted the opportunity to bring the embryos to term. Id.
24. See id. at 597 (holding that the embryos are not strictly persons or property but
“occupy an interim category that entitles them to a special respect because of their potential for
human life”); Appellant’s Opening Brief at 18, Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2019) (No. 1 CA-CV 17-0617 FC), 2018 AZ App. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 123 (stating Arizona
accords a special status to frozen embryos rather than just treating them as property to be
equitably distributed under the state statute); Bilbao v. Goodwin, 65 Conn. L. Rptr. 357, 2017
WL 5642280 at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2017) (“The embryos are not purely property, nor are they
persons, but they are deserving of respect.”); McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 158
(Miss. 2016) (finding the embryos to be “marital property of a special character” (emphasis
added)). But see Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1132 (2012) (stating that the parties and trial
court agreed the embryos were property subject to equitable distribution).
25. Debele & Crockin, supra note 17, at 85.
26. Of note, Sofia Vergara was not married to her partner, so her legal dispute did not
occur within the parameters of divorce law.
27. See, e.g., Shari Puterman, Sofia Vergara Loses ‘Custody Battle’ Over Frozen
Embryos,
USA
TODAY
(June
27,
2018,
3:14
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2018/06/27/sofia-vergara-custody-battle-frozenembryos-nick-loeb/739250002/ [https://perma.cc/CF5R-M9F6].
28. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, Court to Weigh if One Parent has the Right to Use
Frozen Embryos if the Other Objects, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2018, 12:01 AM),
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learned that the Arizona trial court resolved the embryo dispute in Terrell
v. Torres by ordering the embryos to be donated to a third party.29 Amidst
the outcry, the Arizona state legislature resolved to address the problem
by passing a statute creating an official policy instructing the courts how
to handle the disposition of embryos in a contested divorce.30 Despite
(and perhaps as a direct result of) these recent high-profile cases, the
public legal discourse is only just beginning.31 From this discourse, a
serious question arises: do couples starting the IVF process truly
comprehend the potential legal consequences of freezing their embryos?32
Additionally, since only a small number of cases and states have
addressed the disposition of embryos during a divorce, there is no
widespread predictability regarding dispute resolution.33 While states
generally prefer to enforce contracts, many cases have not involved valid
contracts regarding the disposition of the embryos in the event of a
divorce, and there has not been much guidance as to what makes an
embryo disposition contract enforceable. In the event of no contract or an
invalid contract, courts have chosen to use the balancing of interests test.
The recent decision by the Colorado Supreme Court tried to remedy this
predictability problem for the citizens of Colorado.34 The Court found
that if an agreement with the clinic regarding disposition of embryos is
clear and enforceable,35 then the court should enforce the terms of that
agreement.36 However, if there is no clear, enforceable agreement for the

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/court-to-weigh-if-one-parent-hasthe-right-to-use-frozen-embryos-if-the-other-objects/2018/01/08/f675edc2-f491-11e7-beb6c8d48830c54d_story.html?utm_term=.6a589970cf46 [https://perma.cc/F8TZ-GJKA].
29. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Under New Arizona Law, Custody of Disputed Embryos
Goes to Whoever Will Help Them ‘Develop to Birth’, THE SEATTLE TIMES (July 18, 2018, 7:29
PM) [hereinafter “Custody of Disputed Embryos”], https://www.seattletimes.com/nationworld/under-new-arizona-law-custody-of-disputed-embryos-goes-to-whoever-will-help-themdevelop-to-birth/; Chris Gros, Judge Orders Cancer Survivor to Donate Embryos Created with
Ex-Husband, ABC15 ARIZONA (last updated Sept. 1, 2017, 11:01 PM),
https://www.abc15.com/news/region-phoenix-metro/central-phoenix/judge-orders-cancersurvivor-to-donate-embryos-created-with-ex-husband [https://perma.cc/56X6-23LH].
30. Custody of Disputed Embryos, supra, note 29.
31. Debele & Crockin, supra note 17.
32. Id.
33. See infra Part I.
34. In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 581 (Colo. 2018).
35. The Colorado Supreme Court provided no guidance on what would make a contract
clear and enforceable. It remains undetermined whether this analysis would be controlled by
Colorado contract law generally. See generally In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579 (Colo.
2018).
36. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 581.
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court to implement, then trial courts must consider a number of factors.37
The analysis of this decision may provide new guidance to other state
courts when crafting their own balancing tests. In the absence of guidance
from the Colorado legislature in the form of a statute, the Colorado
Supreme Court had no option but to create its own test. The clear
guidelines of the balancing test in the Rooks decision could inform other
state courts on determining how to balance interests as a matter of firstimpression.38 The Colorado Supreme Court changed the balancing test
approach from a simple analysis, weighing one party’s right to procreate
against the right of the other party not to be forced into parenthood, to a
multi-factor test that considers, among other factors, the reasons why the
parties began IVF and the intentions of the parties if awarded the
embryos.39 However, it remains the prevailing trend to try to use the
parties’ contract whenever possible.
Part I of this note discusses the current status of the law concerning
embryo disposition upon divorce. Part II argues that state courts should
avoid blanket enforcement of fertility clinic contracts, and instead only
enforce contracts that provide additional protections for the parties in the
event of a dispute. When fertility contracts do not meet these heightened
contract standards or do not exist, then courts should use the balancing of
interests approach, which should consider the parties’ wishes at the time
they signed a contract with the fertility clinic.
I.

THREE CURRENT APPROACHES FOR JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

37. Id. Here, the court delineated a number of factors that the trial court should consider,
as well as a number of factors that would be improper for consideration including:
(1) the intended use of the pre-embryos by the spouse who wants to preserve them
(for example, whether the spouse wants to use the pre-embryos to become a genetic
parent him- or herself, or instead wants to donate them); (2) the demonstrated
physical ability (or inability) of the spouse seeking to implant the pre-embryos to
have biological children through other means; (3) the parties’ original reasons for
undertaking IVF (for example, whether the couple sought to preserve a spouse’s
future ability to bear children in the face of fertility-implicating medical
treatment); (4) the hardship for the spouse seeking to avoid becoming a genetic
parent, including emotional, financial, or logistical considerations; (5) a spouse’s
demonstrated bad faith or attempt to use the pre-embryos as unfair leverage in the
divorce proceedings; and (6) other considerations relevant to the parties’ specific
situation.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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CONCERNING EMBRYO DISPUTES
There are three established approaches that state courts use in
determining the disposition of frozen embryos: the contract approach, the
balancing of interests approach, and the contemporaneous mutual consent
approach. The contract approach provides that the court enforce the
parties’ agreement with the fertility clinic at the time of divorce.40 The
balancing of interests approach provides that the court consider various
factors, such as the parties respective interests in procreating or not
procreating, and weigh the factors to determine an equitable result.41 The
contemporaneous mutual consent approach provides that the court takes
no action and instead orders the embryos to remain in their current form
(cryogenically frozen) until such a time that the parties are able to agree
on a disposition for the embryos—for example destroying, donating, or
implanting the embryos.42 These three approaches are discussed further
below.
A. ! The Contract Approach
The contract approach provides that an agreement between spouses
that was entered into when the embryos were created and cryostored will
be presumed valid and enforced as to the disposition of the embryos at the
time of a dissolution of marriage.43 The belief is that these agreements
“should be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the
progenitors.”44 A perceived advantage of the contract approach is that it
“reserve[es] to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the first
instance, a quintessentially personal, private decision,” and it avoids
litigation in “personal matters of reproductive choice.”45 However, the
contract approach requires a party to actively rescind the contract should
he or she no longer agree to the terms.46 Three states who use the strict
contract enforcement approach are Tennessee, New York, and Texas, as
discussed below.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
Rooks, 429 P.3d at 581.
In Re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003).
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
Id.
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
See Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, 162 A.D.3d 401, 403-04 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
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1. Tennessee
The Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the disposition of frozen
embryos at the time of divorce in the 1992 decision of Davis v. Davis.47
Mary Sue Davis and Junior Lewis Davis disagreed48 about what to do with
their frozen embryos at the time of their divorce trial.49 Mary Sue asked
that the embryos be awarded to her.50 She intended to use them to
conceive post-divorce.51 In contrast, Junior Lewis sought an order that the
embryos would remain frozen until he was able to decide if he wished to
become a parent outside of marriage.52 The Tennessee Supreme Court
ultimately held that when resolving embryo disputes, the court should first
consider the current wishes of the parties and the prior agreement of the
parties.53 If there is no prior agreement, then the court should balance the
parties’ interests.54 When balancing interests, the party wishing to avoid
procreation should prevail, unless one party has no reasonable possibility
of achieving parenthood by any other means.55 If that party has no other
means of achieving parenthood, then the award of the embryos for
purposes of use by one party should be considered.56 In this case, since
the husband wished to avoid procreation, his interests prevailed over the
wife’s, and he was awarded the embryos.57
2. New York
New York has had two appellate decisions concerning the disposition
of embryos.58 New York dealt with embryo disposition as a matter of first

47. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588.
48. The parties also disagreed about the disposition of the embryos at the time the case
reached the Tennessee Supreme Court, however, their positions had changed by this point. Id.
at 590. Instead, Mary Sue had remarried and wished to donate the embryos to a childless couple,
while Junior Lewis opposed donation and instead requested that the embryos be discarded. Id.
49. Id. at 589.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 604.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See generally Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Finkelstein v. Finkelstein,
162 A.D.3d 401 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
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impression in Kass v. Kass.59 More recently, New York has affirmed the
contract approach of Kass in Finkelstein v. Finkelstein.60
a. Kass v. Kass
The New York Court of Appeals, the highest state court in New York,
determined that a fertility clinic contract should be enforced in the event
of a divorce in the 1998 case of Kass v. Kass.61 That court determined that
the clinic consent form signed by the Kasses manifested the parties’ joint
decision to donate the embryos in the event they became divorced.62 The
New York Court of Appeals found that these agreements with clinics did
not inherently violate public policy.63 Since the agreement manifested the
agreed-upon wishes of the parties, there was no reason for the court to
consider any additional information.64 The court took the position that
since the parties made the informed decision to engage in the contract with
the clinic, the court should enforce that contract.65
b. Finkelstein v. Finkelstein
In Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, an intermediate appellate court, determined that Yoram
Finkelstein’s written revocation of consent constituted a valid withdrawal
of consent and was also enforceable as part of the contract.66 During the
pendency of the Finkelsteins’ divorce, Yoram Finkelstein sought an order
from the trial court to prevent Bat-El Yishay Finkelstein from unilaterally
implanting the frozen embryo to conceive.67 When the court granted less
stringent relief than requested, Yoram Finkelstein first executed and had
notarized a pre-printed form entitled “Notice of Disposition of Frozen
Sperm/Testicular Tissue,” which included a handwritten note indicating
he was revoking his consent for the use of his genetic material, including
the embryo created with Bat-El Yishay Finkelstein.68 He also, on the same
day, signed a second notarized statement indicating he was revoking his
consent for the use of his genetic material, including the embryo created
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174.
Finkelstein, 162 A.D.3d at 401.
Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 182.
Id. at 181.
Id. Neither party made an argument that the agreements violated public policy. Id.
Id.
Id.
Finkelstein, 162 A.D.3d at 401.
Id.
Id.

304

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:295

with Bat-El Yishay Finkelstein.69 When the effects of Yoram’s revocation
of consent for the disposition of the embryo was ultimately considered by
the New York appeals court, the court determined that the contract
approach established in Kass necessitated a finding that the revocation
was valid.70 Since the revocation documents, when taken in conjunction
with the original contract, made the intention of the parties clear, the court
must carry out the plain purpose of the agreement.71
3.

Texas

The Texas Court of Appeals decided that the contract enforcement
approach was required for embryo disposition under Texas’s public policy
in the 2006 case of Roman v. Roman.72 The parties in that case suffered
from long-term infertility issues and failed attempts at artificial
insemination before ultimately beginning IVF.73 The parties executed a
contract with the fertility clinic indicating that the embryos would be
stored until the clinic determined there were appropriate conditions to
transfer the embryos to the wife’s uterus, and both parties agreed and
consented to such transfer.74 The parties indicated in this document that
they wished for the embryos to be discarded in the case of divorce.75 The
contract contained a provision that the parties could withdraw their
consent to the disposition of the embryos and remove themselves from the
program.76 Ultimately, no embryos were implanted and the husband filed
for divorce.77
The trial court awarded the embryos to the wife, but the Texas Court
of Appeals overturned the trial court since its order was inconsistent with
the parties’ contract.78 The court asserted that “allowing the parties
voluntarily to decide the disposition of frozen embryos in advance of
cryopreservation, subject to mutual change of mind, jointly expressed,
best serves the existing public policy of this State and the interests of the
69. Id. at 402.
70. Id. at 403.
71. Id. at 403–04.
72. Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 50 (Tex. 2006); see infra Section II.E.
73. Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 42.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 43. The husband withdrew his consent the day before the scheduled
implantation. Id. The parties were scheduled for implantation again after that, but the clinic
required that the parties complete counseling first, which was not finished before the husband
filed for divorce. Id.
78. Id. at 49.
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parties.”79 The court determined that a contract satisfying these criteria
does not violate public policy, and therefore should be enforced, and
ordered that the embryos be discarded.80
B. ! The Balancing of Interests Approach
The balancing of interests test requires the court to consider certain
factors and weigh the competing interests of the parties against each
other.81 State courts have differed in deciding which factors can be
appropriately considered by the court when making this equitable
determination.82 The balancing of interests test provides the fact-finder
with full discretion to perform this analysis and determine the outcome of
the disputed embryos.83 Since there is full discretion and the test only
provides a framework for making the decision about the disputed
embryos, outcomes are unpredictable.84 Further, the appropriate factors
for the court to consider when making its determination have only been
created by state common law.85 This common law balancing of interest
test differs from a property distribution or custody analysis, in which
courts are often given guidance from the legislature concerning which
factors it is required to consider in its decision.86 The courts of New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Colorado all have used the balancing of
interests approach.

79. Id. at 50.
80. Id.
81. In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 581 (Colo. 2018).
82. See, e.g., id.
83. See, e.g., id.
84. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 581.
85. Id.
86. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81 (2019) (“In fixing the nature and value of the
property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after considering all the evidence presented by each
party, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the
marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each
of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.
The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition,
preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.), and CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b56 (2019)(“In making or modifying any order [concerning custody, care, education, visitation
and support of children], . . . the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered
and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide
the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their
abilities and interests.), with the balancing of interests test in In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d
579, 581 (Colo. 2018).
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1. New Jersey
In the 2001 case of J.B. v. M.B., the New Jersey Supreme Court
determined that fertility clinic contracts cannot be enforced when one
party changes his or her mind and that, instead, in these situations, a
balancing of interests test should be applied.87 The court determined that
these clinic consent forms are a necessary part of the assisted reproduction
process due to the widespread use of IVF and fertility clinics.88 The court
believed that there would be few cases when the agreement would cease
to exist at a later point and another approach would be needed. It stated
that in those limited situations, the correct approach would then be the
balancing test.89 Because the court believed that ordinarily under the
balancing of interest test the party wishing to avoid parenthood will
prevail, the court did not anticipate additional litigation as a result of its
decision.90 Additionally, in an attempt to limit future disputes regarding
embryo disposition, the court encouraged clinics to model their
agreements in a certain way.91
Principles of fairness dictate that agreements provided by a clinic
should be written in plain language, and that a qualified clinic
representative should review the terms with the parties prior to
execution. Agreements should not be signed in blank, . . . or in a
manner suggesting that the parties have not given due consideration to
the disposition question.92

This statement by the New Jersey court highlights a concern with
strictly enforcing clinic agreements. These considerations are discussed
further in Part II.
2. Pennsylvania
In the 2012 case of Reber v. Reiss, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
determined that the balancing of interests test is the appropriate test in the
absence of an enforceable agreement.93 In this case, the court construed
the agreement with the clinic to be one about the storage of the embryos,
rather than one between the parties determining the ultimate disposition

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
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of any remaining embryos in the event of divorce.94 The court then
balanced the wife’s interests in procreating using the remaining embryos
with the husband’s interest in avoiding unwanted procreation by way of
those embryos.95 This court affirmed the trial court’s determination that
the balancing of interests tipped in favor of the wife and affirmed the
award of the embryos to the wife.96 In this case, an important factor was
that the wife had no ability to have biological children without the use of
the disputed embryos.97
3. Colorado
In the 2018 decision of In re Marriage of Rooks, the Colorado
Supreme Court decided that when determining the disposition of
contested embryos during a divorce proceeding, courts should first look
to a preexisting agreement of the parties.98 In the absence of an agreement
on the subject, judges should use the balancing of interests test.99
Importantly, the Colorado Supreme Court was very clear as to what
factors could and could not be considered by the trial court when applying
the balancing of interests test.100 The Colorado trial court’s decision was
94. Id. at 1136.
95. Id. at 1137–40.
96. Id. at 1142.
97. Id. at 1137.
98. In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 592 (Colo. 2018).
99. Id.
100. Id.
Thus, we hold that a court should look first to any existing agreement expressing
the spouses’ intent regarding disposition of the couple’s remaining pre-embryos in
the event of divorce. In the absence of such an agreement, a court should seek to
balance the parties’ interests when awarding the pre-embryos. In so doing, a court
should consider (1) the intended use of the pre-embryos by the spouse who wants
to preserve them (for example, whether the spouse wants to use the pre-embryos
to become a genetic parent him- or herself, or instead wants to donate them); (2)
the demonstrated physical ability (or inability) of the spouse seeking to implant the
pre-embryos to have biological children through other means; (3) the parties’
original reasons for undertaking IVF (for example, whether the couple sought to
preserve a spouse’s future ability to bear children in the face of fertility-implicating
medical treatment); (4) the hardship for the spouse seeking to avoid becoming a
genetic parent, including emotional, financial, or logistical considerations; (5) a
spouse’s demonstrated bad faith or attempt to use the pre-embryos as unfair
leverage in the divorce proceedings; and (6) other considerations relevant to the
parties’ specific situation. However, a court should not consider whether the
spouse seeking to use the pre-embryos to become a genetic parent can afford a
child. Nor shall the sheer number of a party’s existing children, standing alone, be
a reason to preclude implantation of the pre-embryos. Finally, a court should not
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overturned since it only balanced the competing interests of a parent
seeking to be impregnated with an embryo against the interests of the
parent who wished not to become a parent.101 Since the Colorado trial
court only performed a limited balancing analysis, the case was remanded
to the trial court with instructions to apply the balancing framework put in
place by the Colorado Supreme Court.102
While the Colorado Supreme Court expressed that judges should first
look to any pre-existing agreements of the parties, it also created a
balancing test with clearly established factors that produced a predictable
framework.103 This balancing test considers each party’s intentions for
the embryos at the time of disposition.104 Additionally, it considers
whether a party is physically able or unable to conceive biological
children without the embryos.105 It also considers the circumstances
behind the decision of the parties when they decided to begin IVF.106
Under the Colorado decision, unlike the previous balancing tests
instituted in other states, the ability to adopt or otherwise parent nonbiological children cannot be considered when determining the disposition
of the embryos.107 Additionally, unlike other states, the fact that a party
already has genetic children cannot be a sufficient legal justification not
to award the embryos to that party.108
C. The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach
The contemporaneous mutual consent approach contemplates that
“no transfer, release, disposition, or use of the embryos can occur without
consider whether the spouse seeking to use the pre-embryos to become a genetic
parent could instead adopt a child or otherwise parent non-biological children.
Id.
101. Id. at 583, 595.
102. Id. at 583, 595. The trial court has not had a hearing on the remand issue as of the
writing of this Note. In January of 2019, Mandy Rooks filed a Petition for Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Marriage of Rooks,
429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018) (No. 18-959). The issues of the petition are: (1) “[w]hether
extracorporeal embryos created during marriage are people or a property” and (2) “[w]hether
classifying extracorporeal embryos as property and permitting one spouse to discard or donate
them to a third party violates the religious rights of the other spouse who believes the embryos
are ensouled.” Id. The Supreme Court declined to take certiorari of this matter. Rooks v.
Rooks, 139 S.Ct. 1447 (2019).
103. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 581.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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the signed authorization of both donors.”109 When the parties are unable
to reach an agreement, the status quo remains in effect.110 Practically, this
results in the embryos being stored indefinitely unless both parties agree
to the destruction of the embryos.111 Because of this practical reality, the
court usually orders that any expense associated with maintaining the
frozen embryos be borne by the person opposing destruction.112 Since this
approach provides for the embryos to continue to exist in storage
indefinitely, there is no closure for the parties and they remain legally, and
perhaps emotionally, entangled.
1.

Iowa

In the 2003 decision of In re Marriage of Witten, the Iowa Supreme
Court refused to strictly enforce clinic contracts, and instead indicated that
agreements should be followed subject to the individual parties’ right to
change their minds.113 It held that clinic agreements do not inherently
violate public policy.114 The Court went on to say:
Only when one person makes known the agreement no longer reflects
his or her current values or wishes is public policy implicated. Upon
this occurrence, allowing either party to withdraw his or her agreement
to a disposition that person no longer accepts acknowledges the public
policy concerns inherent in enforcing prior decisions of a
fundamentally personal nature.115

Since the Witten case dealt with a party who withdrew consent to the
original clinic agreement, the Iowa court had to address what approach to
take when the contract analysis was inconsistent with public policy and,
therefore, could not be applied.116 Because the court found the contract
approach only to be appropriate when neither party changed his or her
mind, and opined that the balancing test “substitutes the court as decision
maker,” the court determined the proper approach was the
contemporaneous mutual consent approach.117

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 783.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2. Missouri
The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order of
contemporaneous mutual consent.118 The order stated that “no transfer,
release, or use of the frozen [pre-]embryos shall occur without the signed
authorization of both.”119 The court took the position that this prevented
unwarranted governmental intrusion into an intimate decision and left the
decision concerning the embryos to the parties alone.120
II. IT IS TIME TO MOVE AWAY FROM A STRICT CONTRACT +
ENFORCEMENT APPROACH AND TOWARD A HEIGHTENED CONTRACT +
STANDARD +
Given the high number of embryos currently being cryogenically
stored, the recent rise in embryo-based appeals, and the large number of
states that have not yet addressed embryo disposition in contested divorce
cases, it seems likely that there will be future instances of embryo disputes
in which states are required to make decisions, either by statute or through
case law. Since it is important to institute an approach that contemplates
that people can change their minds when circumstances change, this Note
argues against a strict enforcement of contract. The ideal approach must
consider the proposition that parties may agree to a disposition when
beginning IVF treatment without fully understanding the long-term
consequences of that decision.
This Part argues that fertility clinic agreements should not be
enforceable contracts absent certain protections that ensure the parties
understand the long-term consequences of their decision. Additionally, it
argues that there are situations in which contract enforcement at the time
of divorce creates an unequitable result that separates it from most other
contracts.121 This Note likens the heightened standards of other family
law contracts—specifically prenuptial and post-nuptial agreements, and
surrogacy contracts—to the fertility clinic contracts. If fertility clinic
contracts are subject to judicial enforcement, then they should also be
required to have more stringent protections in place for the parties in order
to be enforceable. Absent a contract that is consistent with protections for
the parties at the time of execution and remains equitable in the event of
the divorce, courts should use the balancing of interests approach. Finally,
this Part considers whether the current state statutes or the ABA Model
118.
119.
120.
121.

McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 157.
See infra Section II.B.
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Act truly address the concerns that state courts have had relating to the
strict enforcement of contract.
A. It Currently Remains Unclear if Standard Fertility Clinic Contracts
Are Truly Enforceable Contracts
Several of the cases discussed previously found public policy reasons
to question the enforceability of fertility clinic contracts.122 These clinic
consent forms are complicated documents that may limit the parties’
ability to fully understand their contents.123 While the argument for
contract enforcement is that the parties are subject to informed consent
before signing the fertility contract, there is reason to question whether the
information given to the parties results in a level of understanding that
truly constitutes informed consent.124 The argument that the parties are
subject to informed consent assumes that the parties are making an
independent, informed decision regarding the disposition of embryos.125
Infertility puts tremendous emotional strain on the parties and the marital
relationship,126 so the decision may not be an independent, informed
decision, and instead may be a coerced or single-minded decision.127
Additionally, these clinic forms are extensive—they are not just short
agreements regarding the disposition of embryos.128 They contain an
overwhelming amount of information for the parties to read, process, and

122. See supra Part I.
123. Forman, supra note 2, at 379.
124. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
125. See id.
At the same time, we recognize that life is not static, and that human emotions run
particularly high when a married couple is attempting to overcome infertility
problems. It follows that the parties’ initial “informed consent” to IVF procedures
will often not be truly informed because of the near impossibility of anticipating,
emotionally and psychologically, all the turns that events may take as the IVF
process unfolds.
Id.
126. See id.
127. See Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 53 (Tex. App. 2006) (noting that the wife
“testified that she would have signed anything to move forward because her goal was to have a
child”); see also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 1, Bilbao v. Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977 (Conn.
2019) (SC 20078), 2018 WL 9536783. But see Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers, Connecticut Chapter, at 10 n.8, Bilbao v. Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977
(Conn. 2019) (SC 20078), 2019 WL 4228566 (“embryo creation agreements as a whole do not
pit one spouse against the other and instead represent them joining together in a future familial
endeavor”).
128. Forman, supra note 2, at 379.
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understand.129 The forms contain “highly technical language in densely
packed, single-spaced documents, that may not even clearly delineate
different topics.”130 Additionally, even when clinic personnel address the
parties’ concerns about a lengthy consent, it is still one of many medical
forms a patient must complete prior to treatment.131 This is contrary to the
court’s assumption when enforcing a contract that parties make informed
decisions to partake in these contracts.132
Further, parties often execute these forms without “due consideration
of the ramifications.”133 In fact, it is not uncommon for parties to fill out
some parts of the form and leave other parts of the form blank for the other
party to complete.134 Because these documents are presented as “form
contracts drafted by or on behalf of the physicians or clinics, these forms
are invariably poorly written and frequently fatally ambiguous and
confusing.”135
Furthermore, the forms are presented at or before the commencement
of treatment, at a time the parties are emotionally and mentally fragile,
and perhaps desperate to move forward and have a child.136 This is a time
when the parties are “psychologically and emotionally ill-equipped to
consider the options for disposition.”137 Since these people are focusing
on having a child, it is unrealistic to expect them to carefully consider
worst-case scenarios and how they should be handled.138
The parties are also unlikely to ask any questions about the legal
considerations of the documents that they are signing.139 The facts of
some state appellate cases show that there are occasions when at least one

129. Id. See Consent for Cryopreservation and Storage of Embryos, CTR. FOR
ADVANCED REPROD. SERV., https://www.uconnfertility.com/uconn/wp-content/uploads/
2015/02/2-Consent-for-Cryopreservation-of-Embryos2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7SQ-2FU7]
(for an example of a clinic consent form) [hereinafter Consent].
130. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms
are not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 57, 67 (2011); see, e.g., Consent, supra note
129.
131. Id.
132. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 181 (N.Y. 1998).
133. Forman, supra note 2, at 379.
134. Id.; see, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000).
135. Forman, supra note 2, at 379.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Forman, supra note 130, at 70. Generally, when the parties are planning on having
a child together, they are not contemplating their relationship ending or one of the parties dying.
Id.
139. Id. at 75.
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of the parties signs the clinic documents at home.140 When the parties do
review the document with a member of the fertility clinic staff, it is usually
either with a doctor or a nurse coordinator.141 It is likely that the questions
asked of this medical staff member are of a medical nature, not a legal
one.142 There is usually no legal consultant involved to answer any legal
questions the parties may have.143 These forms do not indicate that the
parties should consult a lawyer for independent legal advice concerning
the form or any legal rights that are affected by the execution of the
form.144 Additionally, since the medical and contract provisions are
combined in these clinic consent forms, there are many different types of
information that the parties are asked to process at once.145
Some courts, like the Connecticut trial courts, have found that
standard clinic consent forms do not constitute valid contracts.146 In Mate
v. Mate, a case of first impression in Connecticut, the trial court found that
such forms were not consistent with the contract standards required by
Connecticut law.147 In that case, the wife asked to be awarded the
embryos, while the husband asked for destruction of the embryos, or, in
the alternative, a finding that any children born from those embryos are
not children of the relationship.148 A major issue the Connecticut trial
court had with the form is that this “contract” is more of a “check the box”
questionnaire than a “carefully considered and drafted understanding.”149
These pro forma documents do not capture the nuances that the court
would find relevant—for example, not allowing the couple to specify
different dispositions depending on the outcome of IVF.150

140. Id.
141. Id. at 76.
142. Id.
143. Mary Ziegler, Beyond Balancing: Rethinking the Law of Embryo Disposition 68 AM.
U. L. REV. 515, 564 (2019); see Forman, supra note 130, at 76.
144. See, e.g., Consent, supra note 129.
145. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 685 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).
146. Bilbao v. Goodwin, 65 Conn. L. Rptr. 357, at *3 (2017) (No. HHD FA-16-6071615S), rev’d, 217 A.3d 977 (2019). The Connecticut Supreme Court has since overturned the trial
court’s decision. Bilbao v. Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977 (Conn. 2019).
147. Mate v. Mate, FBTFA 156048231, 2016 WL 6603254 at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept.
23, 2016).
148. Id. at *6. It should be noted that a finding that children born from embryos awarded
after a contested divorce are not children of the marriage is consistent with the Uniform
Parentage Act’s intention. See Uniform Parentage Act, §§ 706–07 (2017).
149. Mate, 2016 WL 6603254 at *8.
150. Forman, supra note 130, at 78.
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Additionally, in cases where one party was to receive the embryos in
the event of a divorce, this Connecticut trial court believed that there was
a lack of consideration for this concession.151 As a general rule, courts
require several contractual elements to be present in an agreement before
it can be construed as valid and enforceable.152 There must be offer and
acceptance—a meeting of the minds—the consent of each party to the
terms, consideration, and the “execution and delivery of the contract with
the intent that it be mutual and binding.”153 Further, there are clearly
established defenses to defeat contracts, such as duress and
unconscionability.154 The Connecticut trial court in Mate determined
“[a]n order that balances both [parties’] interests and is in conformity with
our public policy is most appropriate.”155 In the only other Connecticut
trial court case addressing embryo disposition at the time of divorce, the
judge followed the Mate decision and also applied the balancing of
interests test, holding that the standard clinic consent form does not
constitute an enforceable contract under Connecticut law.156
Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held a clinic
consent form was not enforceable in A.Z. v. B.Z.157 The court found the

151. Mate, 2016 WL 6603254 at *8. When the Connecticut Supreme Court overturned
the trial court in Bilbao, it articulated that the consideration was the mutual exchange of
promises and contribution of genetic material. Bilbao v. Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977, *989 (Conn.
2019).
152. Forman, supra note 130, at 103.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Mate, 2016 WL 6603254 at *18. The court awarded the embryos to the wife with
the following conditions: (1) wife would be solely responsible for all costs associated with
maintaining the embryos and would hold harmless and indemnify the defendant; (2) if and when
the wife decides to conceive a child using the embryos, she is to give the husband ninety days
written notice by in-hand service by a process server before implantation; (3) upon notice, the
husband shall have the option of terminating any parental rights through the appropriate court,
with the wife being responsible for all costs; (4) the wife shall not object to the husband’s
termination of parental rights request; and (5) in the event any future court orders the father to
financially support any future child, the wife shall indemnify and hold harmless the husband for
any expense, including reasonable legal fees. Id.
156. Bilbao v. Goodwin, 65 Conn. L. Rptr. 357, at *3 (2017) (No. HHD FA-16-6071615S), rev’d, 217 A.3d 977 (2019). In this case, the order that followed the Connecticut balancing
of interests approach, consistent with public policy, was an order that “[t]he embryos shall be
the property of [the wife].” Id. at *4. The wife did not want more children or to have the
embryos created using her eggs be donated to strangers. Id. The husband already had six
children. Id. It was unlikely that the parties would reconcile. Id. Additionally, the wife’s
interest in the control and management of her eggs—which were used in the creation of the
embryos—outweighs any interest the husband may have in donating them to a stranger. Id.
157. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1051 (Mass. 2000).
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clinic form to be flawed for several reasons.158 First, its main purpose was
to define the donor’s relationship with the clinic and it did not indicate it
was acting as a binding agreement on the parties.159 Second, there was no
duration provision in the form and a substantial amount of time had passed
between the time the parties signed the consent form and the time of the
parties’ divorce action.160 Third, the form used the phrase “[s]hould we
become separated” and did not define what the term “separated” meant.161
Fourth, the consent form was legally insufficient under Massachusetts
General Laws, since “it did not contain provisions for custody, support,
and maintenance, in the event that the wife . . . gives birth to a child.”162
Additionally, there was an issue as to whether the husband actually
consented to the provisions regarding the disposition of embryos upon
separation, since the evidence suggested that the husband signed blank
consent forms and allowed the wife to complete them.163 In any case, the
court determined that even if these flaws did not exist and the contract was
unambiguous, the court could not enforce an agreement compelling one
party to become a parent against his or her present objection because
forced procreation goes against public policy.164
Additionally, agreements with fertility clinics can certainly leave
room for different interpretations and disputes regarding facts and
understandings between the two parties. Such disputes show there was
not a mutual understanding of the terms of the agreement when the
agreement was reached. This was part of the issue in In re Marriage of
Dahl & Angle.165 The wife’s position at trial was that
when she and husband signed the agreement, they had intended to use
the embryos to create a child for themselves as a married couple and
did not intend to use the embryos if they were no longer married. She
further stated that they had discussed what would happen to any
embryos that were not used by them and had agreed that they would
donate the embryos to a facility for scientific research. Her
understanding of the agreement was that, if she and husband disagreed
on the disposition of the embryos, she would have sole and exclusive
right to direct [fertility clinic] to transfer or dispose of the embryos.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 1056.
Id.
Id. at 1056–57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 837 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
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She opposed having the embryos donated to another woman for
implantation.166

On the contrary, the husband’s position at trial was that he
denied having initialed or read the [fertility clinic] agreement, and
stated that he had signed the last page of the document without a notary
present and without having seen the rest of the document. He said that
he believed that the “embryos are life,” and opposed their destruction
or donation to science because “there’s no pain greater than having
participated in the demise of your own child.” Accordingly, he wished
to have the embryos donated to others who were attempting to
conceive. He testified that he would do “everything” to protect wife’s
and J’s confidentiality related to the donation of the embryos, but
acknowledged that he could not guarantee their anonymity.167

Ultimately, the court did not find the conflicting testimony
compelling enough to disregard the contract, so the court enforced the
contract as written.168
A lack of clarity in the drafting of contracts generally can lead to
dispute and possibly litigation. Unclear drafting in embryo disposition
contracts specifically presents different interpretations with serious
ramifications. These agreements should be written in plain language169 so
that the parties understand and structure in a way that eliminates the
possibility for multiple reasonable interpretations.
Multiple reasonable interpretations of an embryo disposition contract
led to different interpretations by the Arizona intermediate appellate court
and the Supreme Court of Arizona in the case of Terrell v. Torres.170 In
that case, the court of appeals read the paragraph under the “Divorce or
Dissolution of Relationship” provision to provide the court with discretion
to award the embryos to one party or to direct the donation of the

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 842.
Husband does not argue that the agreement itself is ambiguous or invalid for public
policy reasons. Rather, he asks that we award possession of (and decision-making
authority over) the embryos to him, because his belief that the embryos are life and
his desire to donate the embryos in a way that would allow ‘his offspring to develop
their full potential as human beings’ should outweigh wife’s interest in avoiding
genetic parenthood.
Id. at 841.
169. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001).
170. Terrell v. Torres, 456 P.3d. 13, 17 (Ariz. 2020). See Part II.E.4 infra for discussion
of the trial court decision and the statute enacted while the appeal was pending.
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embryos.171 The Arizona Supreme Court overturned that court’s decision,
determining the proper interpretation of the contract was to read that
provision in conjunction with the provision requiring contemporaneous
consent to create a pregnancy.172 The fact that two appellate courts,
consisting of highly educated and experienced judges, differed in their
interpretation of a contract demonstrates the likelihood that individuals
without extensive education and experience in contract drafting could
have different understandings of a contract. Given that the parties are
signing a sophisticated agreement with long-term ramifications, the
parties should understand how their rights are being affected. A higher
level of scrutiny or additional protections would ensure that parties
understand how their interests are being affected by an embryo disposition
agreement.
There is evidence that parties are likely to change their opinions
regarding embryo disposition over time.173 When parties are dealing with
infertility, they experience significant stress, which increases the
likelihood of selective perception.174 When parties initially sign the
agreement regarding the disposition of embryos, the embryos do not yet
exist, so they are not a real or tangible concept for the parties.175 When
they make the decision, the parties do not know whether they will need all
of the embryos to have a successful pregnancy.176 Since these embryos
are an abstract concept, couples experience a low level of conflict over
embryo disposition before undergoing IVF.177 This greatly differs from
the high emotional conflict regarding the decision for the disposition of
the embryos after the parties have undergone IVF treatment.178 Parties
often support donation of the unused embryos to research or another
infertile couple before having a successful birth of a child.179 However,
once the parties have had a successful birth, then they often perceive the
unused embryos to be their child’s siblings and struggle with the idea of
giving the embryos away.180 Proponents of the contract approach argue
that the ability to subsequently amend the contract or revoke consent
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Terrell, 456 P.3d at 15.
Id. at 16.
Forman, supra note 2, at 387.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 390.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 391.
Id.
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allows the parties the flexibility needed to adapt the agreement to
changing circumstances and to address new concerns.181 It is important
that parties have the ability to amend the contract or revoke their consent
after they initially sign the agreement and that the clinics permit such
modifications.
B. Strict Enforcement of Contract Creates the Opportunity for an
Inequitable Result—One That Would Be Deemed Unconscionable in
the Context of a Prenuptial or Postnuptial Agreement.
The use of the contract approach at times results in what is arguably
an unequitable result.182 One possible consideration when determining if
a result is truly equitable is the future ability of both parties to have
children. When courts employ the balancing test, they look to see if the
parties have already had children, and if the parties still have the ability to
have children in the future, either biologically or by way of adoption.183
Because a person with a history of illness, such as cancer, has a harder
time adopting, the court should consider if the person has no biological
way to have a child other than the embryos.184 Additionally, someone who
is older is less likely to be selected as a parent in the private adoption
system than a younger parent.185 Also, a single parent has a harder time
adopting than a married couple.186 This reality puts older women who
have survived cancer at a distinct disadvantage.187 These women attempt
181. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 685 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).
182. See Melissa B. Herrera, Note, Arizona Gamete Donor Law: A Call for Recognizing
Women’s Asymmetrical Property Interest in Pre-Embryo Disposition Disputes, 30 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S LAW J. 119, 141 (2019). Herrera argues that women should presumptively win all
embryo disputes as a result of their superior genetic contribution. Id. Because women undergo
a more intense and invasive procedure in egg extraction than men undergo in sperm collection
and because women lose their fertility at menopause while men retain their fertility indefinitely,
the women should have a superior property claim in embryos that result from their eggs. Id.
183. See In Re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 581 (Colo. 2018); Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W. 2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
184. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
185. Id. However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated:
There is no question that the ability to have a biological child and/or be pregnant
is a distinct experience from adoption. Thus, simply because adoption or foster
parenting may be available to [a party], it does not mean that such options should
be given equal weight in a balancing test. Adoption is a laudable, wonderful and
fulfilling experience for those wishing to experience parenthood, but there is no
question that it occupies a different place for a woman than the opportunity to be
pregnant and/or have a biological child.
Id. at 1138.
186. Id. at 1139.
187. Id.
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to preserve their fertility by undergoing egg extraction and freezing
embryos in advance of any cancer treatments that could ruin their
fertility.188 If medical advances help these women survive, but the trials
of cancer cost them their marriage, it should not also cost them their only
chance of having a child. If the court is trying to create an equitable result,
then denying embryos to these women cannot be deemed equitable.189 It
could discourage women from freezing their eggs in the form of embryos
with their husband’s sperm.190
Since these clinic agreements regarding embryos deal with the
disposition of property upon divorce, similar to a prenuptial or postnuptial
agreement, perhaps the clinic agreements should have similar contract
standards applied to their enforcement.191 These clinic agreements are an
agreement between two people in an intimate relationship regarding the
disposition of “property” in case of a divorce.192 Therefore, perhaps,
similar to prenuptial and postnuptial agreements, there should be clear
defenses to the enforcement of the embryo contract if one party no longer
wishes to be bound by the agreement.193
The most applicable of the nuptial agreement contract defenses is the
idea of unconscionability at the time of enforcement.194 The Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act specifically addresses unconscionability.195
Per the Act, a nuptial agreement is unconscionable at the time of execution
if one party lacks the necessary information to understand the full
financial picture of the other party.196 Additionally, an agreement is
unconscionable at the time enforcement is sought if it leaves one party in
such a poor situation that the person has no financial alternative but to
seek public assistance.197 Some states have expanded the defense of
unconscionability. For example, Arkansas courts can find an agreement
188. See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief, Terrel v. Torres, supra note 24, at 3–4.
189. See generally id.
190. See generally id.
191. See generally J. Thomas Oldham, Would Enactment of the Uniform Premarital and
Marital Agreements Act in All Fifty States Change U.S. Law Regarding Premarital
Agreements?, 46 FAM L. Q. 367 (2012).
192. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
193. See generally Oldham, supra note 191.
194. See id. But see Ziegler, supra note 143 (arguing that unconscionability does not
apply to embryo contracts because embryo disputes do not relate to money or relative
contribution).
195. Amberlynn Curry, Comment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Its
Variations Throughout the States, 23 AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 355, 357 (2010).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 358.
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unconscionable if the party did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his
or her property rights after consulting with counsel.198
The unconscionability at the time the agreement is sought defense
could be a possible defense to enforcement of an embryo contract. One
can argue that the decision not to award the embryos to a party who has
no other way to have genetically-related children is unconscionable.199 If
the destruction of the embryos could take away that party’s only
opportunity to have his or her own biological children, then the agreement
may be unconscionable. The provisions of premarital agreement statutes
have provided specific contract defenses for arguing against enforcement
of those contracts.200 Similarly, creating statutes with clearly delineated
defenses against the enforcement of embryo agreements would create a
unique, heightened contract standard for embryo contracts.
In the alternative, such protections could be created through common
law.201 The potential need for a heightened standard was mentioned by
the Connecticut Supreme Court in Bilbao v. Goodwin.202 The Court noted
that intimate partner agreements generally warrant “special scrutiny”
because parties “tend to be less cautious” when contracting with an
intimate partner than with others and because events may occur prior to a
divorce that “go beyond their contemplation at the time they entered into
the agreement.”203 However, such issues did not arise in the Bilbao case
so these statements only amount to dicta.204 Therefore, the Court did not
explicate this standard beyond saying that they “recognize that these
circumstances could arise in other cases.”205 In their amicus curiae brief
for this case, the Connecticut Chapter of the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers advocated that
“while an embryo disposition contract should be considered
presumptively valid and enforceable, that presumption can be rebutted
by a party seeking to avoid enforcement of the agreement if that party

198. Id. at 360.
199. See Unconscionable Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An
agreement that no promisor with any sense, and not under a delusion, would make, and that no
honest and fair promisee would accept.”).
200. See generally Oldham, supra note 191.
201. For example, in Connecticut, a heightened standard of review for postnuptial
agreements was created by way of common law. See generally Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17
(Conn. 2011).
202. Bilbao v. Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977, 989 n.6 (Conn. 2019).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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proves by clear and convincing evidence that the circumstances of the
parties have changed so significantly since the parties entered into the
agreement that enforcement of the agreement would work an injustice.
This standard is akin to the ‘unconscionability at the time enforcement
is sought’ standard for prenuptial and postnuptial agreements.”206

However, the Chapter did not advocate for a possible defense of
unconscionability at the time of execution because in its opinion the same
concerns of transparency and disclosure do not exist.207 It remains
unknown how the Connecticut courts would address a matter when
enforcing the embryo disposition agreement would create an
unconscionable result, but these comments suggest that Connecticut
would potentially use a heightened standard of contract review.
C. ! Unlike Prenuptial Agreements and Surrogacy Contracts, There is
No Statutory Guidance in Place for a Clinic Contract to Be
Enforceable.
In addition to creating subject-specific defenses, states have created
statutory schemes with heightened standards for prenuptial agreements
and surrogacy contracts. State legislatures are able to provide criteria for
permissible contracts through the passage of these statutes.
The contract approach is arguably similar to the enforcement of
prenuptial agreements.208 Both prenuptial agreements and embryo
contracts involve parties making decisions concerning future rights before
engaging in a new legal relationship: marriage or embryo creation. Under
the contract approach for embryo disposition, one party may seek
enforcement of the contract at the time of divorce. However, unlike
prenuptial agreements, there are no statutorily provided grounds for
contesting or seeking enforcement of embryo contracts.209
There are several articulated grounds to contest a prenuptial
agreement. There are requirements of advisement from counsel before
signing, equity at the time of execution, an absence of duress at the time
of execution, and adequate disclosure at the time of execution.210
Additionally, as discussed above, some jurisdictions require that the

206. Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Connecticut
Chapter, at 10, Bilbao v. Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977 (Conn. 2019) (SC 20078), 2019 WL 4228566
(citation omitted).
207. *Id. at 10 n.8.
208. *See generally id.
209. *See generally id.
210. *See generally id.
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agreements not be unconscionable at the time of divorce.211 Postnuptial
agreements follow similar standards. Enforceability of postnuptial
agreements requires fair and full disclosure, equity at the time of signing,
and the agreement cannot be unconscionable at the time of divorce.212
Postnuptial agreements are reviewed carefully when enforcement is at
issue, since the parties have a relationship of mutual confidence and
trust.213 The close relationship of a married couple entering into a
postnuptial agreement greatly differs from the arms-length transaction of
most contracts.214 In fact, this relationship between married spouses even
differs from the relationship of parties about to enter into a prenuptial
agreement.215
Similarly, the parties are married and engaged in a relationship of
mutual confidence and trust when they enter into an embryo contract.
These parties are not engaged in arms-length negotiations. In fact, they
are arguably in an even more intimate relationship than married parties
entering into a post-nuptial agreement. The parties entering into an
embryo contract are beginning the intimate act of conceiving a child
together. There is plenty of cause for concern that these parties are not
making independent decisions.
Some states have recognized a similar need for requirements for
surrogacy contracts and enacted statutes to regulate the enforceability of
those surrogacy contracts. New Hampshire enacted a statute outlining the
criteria for an enforceable surrogacy contract.216 This statute requires that
surrogacy agreements be in writing, executed in advance of the
commencement of any medical procedures intended to impregnate the
surrogate, and executed with the surrogate and future parents having
independent legal counsel advising them.217 The agreement must contain
provisions concerning the obligations of the surrogate and the obligations
of the couple.218 Finally, the agreement must contain provisions
concerning what to do in the event of a breach of the contract and who has
decision-making power in the event of a pregnancy termination.219

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. See supra Section II.B.
See generally Oldham, supra note 191.
Id.
Id.
Id.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:11 (2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Delaware has also enacted a statute applicable to surrogacy contracts
containing similar provisions.220 The Delaware statute requires that the
agreement be in writing and executed in advance of the implantation of
the embryos in the surrogate.221 Delaware also requires that the surrogate
and future parents each be advised by independent counsel.222 However,
the Delaware statute also requires that the carrier and the prospective
parents sign a written statement that they have received information
concerning the “legal, financial, and contractual rights, expectations,
penalties, and obligations of the gestational carrier agreement.”223
California also has similar requirements for a surrogacy agreement.224
Again, the agreement must be in writing, and the carrier and potential
parents need to execute the agreement after consultation with independent
counsel.225 California also has an additional requirement beyond those
imposed by New Hampshire and Delaware; California requires the
agreement to be witnessed and notarized (or witnessed by an equivalent
method of affirmation).226
States should enact statutes that provide similar necessary
requirements for embryo agreements to be enforceable.
These
requirements should be similar to surrogacy contracts, such as requiring
the documents to be witnessed or requiring legal consultation, or they
could be completely unique to embryo contracts. These protections would
ensure the parties receive independent legal counsel and understand the
consequences of the agreement that they are signing.
D. ! States Should Adopt a Heightened Contract Standard, Rather than
the Balancing of Interests or Contemporaneous Mutual Consent
Approach
Instead of attempting to enact statutes providing articulated criteria to
protect the interests of parties under the contract approach, should states
instead employ another approach? While some courts are hesitant to
enforce embryo contracts, there are important critiques of the other
approaches. The balancing of interests approach demands that the court
look at the individual facts and circumstances and perform an analysis as

220. *DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-807 (2019).
221. *Id.
222. *Id.
223. *Id.
224. *CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2018).
225. *Id.
226. *Id.
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to which interests outweigh other interests.227 This results in virtually no
predictability. Generally, the party who does not wish to procreate has the
strongest interest and the other party’s interest in procreation does not
outweigh this.228 However, this approach leaves room for the court to
account for various factors.229 The court can consider the desires of the
party at the time of the creation of the embryos and at the current time.230
It can consider whether the parties already have children.231 It can
consider if the parties have the ability to have children, biologically or
otherwise, beyond the embryos in question.232 While no case has done so
yet, this approach has the capacity to account for changes in a party’s
religious or moral beliefs.233 If a party has a change in their religious or
moral beliefs and no longer agrees with destroying the embryos, the judge
could consider this.234 This approach mimics the way that courts normally
distribute property in divorces when there is not a prenuptial agreement or
postnuptial agreement.235 Normally, courts have a list of statutory factors
that they are to consider.236 They then perform an analysis using those
factors to divide the property.237 The high volume of cases resolving
property distribution has led to some predictability; however, there are so
few embryo disposition cases that there would likely be no real
predictability.
Courts often only employ the balancing of interest approach when
they lack the enforceable contract.238 Courts often are forced to use the
balancing of interests approach even though they would use the contract
approach if they had a valid contract.239 By forcing the court to make
227. In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 581 (Colo. 2018).
228. See In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
229. The factors for the trial court to consider vary by state. See, e.g., Rooks, 429 P.3d at
581; Bilbao v. Goodwin, 65 Conn. L. Rptr. 357, 2017 WL 5642280 at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2017).
230. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 581.
231. Bilbao, 2017 WL 5642280 at *3.
232. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
233. Since the factors vary by state, a state has the ability to select which factors a trial
court should consider.
234. The court or legislature for each state has the capacity to control which factors that
state’s balancing of interest tests consider. See, e.g., Rooks, 429 P.3d at 581. The Colorado
Supreme Court made the decision to exclude certain factors from consideration that other states
had as a part of their balancing of interest tests. Id.
235. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81 (West 2013).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See supra Section I.A.
239. See supra Section I.A.
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decisions concerning the embryos under the balancing of interests test, the
court must take part in unwarranted governmental intrusion into an
intimate decision that is normally not subject to state involvement.240
Recent decisions in other types of family law matters suggest the
beginning of a trend that removes the actual decision-making from the
court and instead the court awards decision-making power to one of the
two parties.241 In the embryo dispute context, this could mean that the
court would award the embryos to one party or the other, but would not
provide instruction such as “awarded to party A to destroy.”
Similarly, courts have criticized the contemporaneous mutual consent
approach because it does not realistically end the dispute between the
parties.242 It effectively keeps the parties intertwined since the practical
result is that the embryos remain frozen until they are no longer viable.243
If the parties were able to reach an agreement regarding the disposition of
their embryos, they would not be seeking an order on the disposition of
those embryos from the court at the time of divorce.
Since the shortcomings of the contract enforcement approach could
be remedied through a heightened contract standard, this new standard
should be the preferred approach. If a contract does not meet heightened
standards or is ambiguous, then the balancing of interests test should be
the preferred test. Since this is asking the government to become involved
in an intimate part of the parties’ lives, it should not be preferred over
contract enforcement with heightened scrutiny. Contract enforcement
with a heightened standard of review provides for people to control, or at
the very least influence, the future disposition of their embryos. If the
contract does not meet heightened standards, then the intentions of the
contract should still be an important factor under the balancing of interests
test.
E. Is Resolving the Doctrinal Dispute by Statute the Answer?
Nationwide, the lack of state statutes providing the courts with
guidance for determining the ultimate disposition of embryos has created
uncertainty for both parties and the judiciary.244 Instead, judges have been
required to create common law that decides the individual state policy for

240. McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 157 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
241. See, e.g., Nicaise v. Sunderam, 418 P.3d 1045 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that
the court can award decision-making powers in a legal custody action but that the court cannot
substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the parties).
242. See In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 581 (Colo. 2018).
243. Id.
244. See supra Part I.
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determining embryo disposition.245 However, some states have tried to
address the problem through legislation.246
1. Florida
Florida’s embryo disposition statute greatly restricts, if not altogether
removes, the court’s ability to award the embryos to either party.247
Florida requires physicians and parties to enter into written agreements
concerning the disposition of embryos in case of divorce, death, or any
other unforeseen circumstance.248 It goes on to state that “[a]bsent a
written agreement, decisionmaking [sic] authority regarding the
disposition of preembryos shall reside jointly with the commissioning
couple.”249 This means that a judge cannot apply a balancing test to award
the embryos to one party over another.250 Of note, the precise language of
the statute gives clear expectations to the parties (and the clinics) that
contracts that make clear the desired intention of the parties upon divorce
are necessary under all circumstances.251 Additionally, it makes it clear
to the judiciary that the parties are expected to agree in advance by way
of contract, and if they cannot, then the parties are given joint decisionmaking power.252 It appears that the intention of this statute is to create a
policy of contract enforcement, and absent a contract, a policy of
contemporaneous mutual consent.253
2. Texas
The Texas legislature passed a statute requiring that both parties
consent to becoming the legal parents of a child conceived by way of IVF
if the implantation occurs after divorce.254 The statute says that “[t]he
consent of a former spouse to assisted reproduction may be withdrawn by
that individual in a record kept by a licensed physician at any time before
the placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos.”255 The statute’s intention is
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17
(West 2018); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.706 (West 2017).
247. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2018).
248. Id.
249. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(2) (West 2018).
250. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2018).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See id. As of the writing of this Note, there are no decisions interpreting this
provision of the statute.
254. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.706(a) (West 2017).
255. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.706(b) (West 2017).
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to make clear that these agreements are enforceable unless the party
actively withdraws his or her consent.256
3. Model Act
The ABA Model Act attempts to create a template for alternative
reproductive technology legal issues, including the disposition of embryos
upon divorce and embryo contracts with clinics.257 However, the Model
Act only provides limited guidance on what provisions an embryo contract
should have.258 The Model Act says the contract needs to be in writing
and needs to include a desired disposition upon death or divorce.259 The
Model Act also indicates that the parties have the right to rescind their
agreement at any time and provides a process for rescinding the
agreement.260 But that is where the guidance ends. There are not
additional protections that would create a heightened contract standard.261
4. Arizona
The Arizona legislature took a unique approach to solving the dispute
concerning how to award embryos at the time of divorce by passing a law
guiding courts concerning how to resolve embryo disputes.262 The
legislature passed this new law while there was an appeal of the issue
pending in the Arizona Court of Appeals.263 The new statute requires
judges to award the embryos to the spouse who intends to develop the
embryos to birth.264 If both spouses express an intention to develop the
embryos to birth, and both spouses provided gametes for the embryos,
then the judge should resolve the dispute in the manner that provides the
best chance to develop the embryos to birth. 265 If both spouses express
an intention to develop the embryos to birth, but only one provided the
gametes for the embryos, then the judge should award the embryos to the
party who provided the gametes.266

256. See id.
257. MODEL ACT CONCERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION § 501 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
258. Id. at § 501.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. The requirements of the model act do not reach the heightened requirements of
prenuptial agreement and surrogacy contracts. See supra Section II.C.
262. See Cha, supra note 29.
263. Id.
264. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (2018).
265. Id.
266. Id.
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The passage of this statute was a reaction to the trial court’s decision
concerning the embryos in Terrell v. Torres.267 John Joseph Terrell and
Ruby Torres chose to create embryos as a result of Torres’ aggressive
bilateral breast cancer diagnosis.268 Before beginning treatment, she took
efforts to preserve her ability to have children in the future by way of
IVF.269 Initially, Terrell did not want to participate in the IVF procedure,
but changed his mind after Torres found another possible donor.270 Terrell
testified that he contributed his sperm as a favor to Torres, but he also
thought they could have a child together eventually.271
The parties signed a clinic consent form and checked-off and initialed
a provision asking that in the case of a divorce, “[a] court decree and/or
settlement agreement will be presented to the Clinic directing use to
achieve a pregnancy in one of us or donation to another couple for that
purpose.”272 There was an additional provision in the clinic consent form
that said “[e]mbryos cannot be used to produce pregnancy against the
wishes of the partner” and used the example of divorce saying that the
embryos could not be used to create a pregnancy “without the express,
written consent of both parties.”273 Terrell signed the clinic form relying
on the mutual consent provision of the document; he did not intend for
Torres to use the embryos without his consent, only for her to use the
embryos with him.274 In fact, he did not expect that she would live to have
children, so he did not expect that she would use the embryos at all,
regardless of his relationship with her.275
Ultimately, Torres survived her cancer, but the testimony showed it
would be a “miracle” for her to have biological children without the frozen
embryos.276 Additionally, adoption was not an option for Torres because

267. See SB 1393: Parental Right to Embryo, CTR. ARIZ. POL’Y,
https://www.azpolicy.org/bill/sb-1393-parental-right-to-embryo/
[https://perma.cc/X72272C4]; Cha, supra note 29.
268. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 24, at 3.
269. Id. at 3–4. While Torres could have just frozen her eggs, she chose IVF because
frozen embryos have a better chance to develop into children than frozen eggs. Id. at 7.
270. Id. at 4. The parties were not yet married at the time the procedure took place. Id.
271. Id.
272. Appellee’s Response Brief, Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019)
(No. 1 CA-CV 17-0617), 2017 WL 7736721.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.

2020]

FROZEN EMBRYOS IN CONTESTED DIVORCE

329

she would likely be unable to qualify due to her medical history.277 In
their Proposed Resolution Statements before the trial, Terrell indicated he
wanted the embryos destroyed and Torres indicated she wanted them
awarded to her, with Terrell having no liability or involvement unless he
chose to do so.278 If the court did not award Torres the embryos, then she
would have had them donated per the contract.279 The court ultimately
decided that the embryos would be placed for donation by the clinic to a
third party or another couple.280 The trial court determined that Terrell’s
right not to be compelled to be a father outweighed Torres’ right to
procreate and have a biologically related child.281 Torres appealed the trial
court decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals.282 Instead of waiting for
this legal dispute to be resolved through the appellate court, the Arizona
legislature passed the statute discussed above.283 However, since the new
statute does not apply retroactively, it did not affect the result of the Torres
case.284
The Arizona statute attempts to eliminate the concerns of forced
parenthood by creating a situation in which the other party is not the legal
parent of any child that develops from the embryos, unless he or she
consents in writing to be the legal parent.285 Absent the written consent,
the other spouse has no legal rights or obligations associated with any

277. Id. Per Terrell’s appellate brief, Torres offered no testimony at trial regarding her
ability to use other options such as using donated embryos, using donated eggs and sperm to
create new embryos, using eggs donated by a family member or anonymously to have a child
biologically related to a new husband, or adoption as a couple or single mother. Id. at 29.
278. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 24, at 8. Critically, when the trial court
obtained a copy of the parties’ IVF contract it found that there was a clear indication that the
parties did not want the embryos to be destroyed and ordered the parties to sign the necessary
documents to continue preserving the embryos. Id. When the parties were subsequently ordered
to submit briefs on embryos as property in Arizona, Terrell changed his proposal to the embryos
being awarded to him so that he could prevent Torres from transferring them to another facility
that would allow her to achieve pregnancy or in the alternative, allow the embryos to remain in
storage indefinitely until the parties were able to agree on their disposition. Id.
279. Id. at 12.
280. Id. at 13. This award is one of the two issues that were appealed in the action.
281. Id. at 12.
282. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019). The decision of the courts of
appeals was subsequently overturned by the Arizona Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial
court’s decision. Terrell v. Torres, 456 P.3d 13, 18 (Ariz. 2020). See Part II.A. infra for further
discussion of this decision.
283. Cha, supra note 29.
284. Id.
285. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (2018).
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potential child.286 However, the approach of this statute seems to only
consider the legal consequences and ignores the emotional or moral
problems associated with forced parenthood.287 In an attempt to dissuade
support for the legislation, the president of the national infertility group
Resolve wrote a letter to the Arizona House of Representatives indicating
that it could be “exceedingly painful” to have biological children born
against one’s wishes.288 In a case like the one of Terrell v. Torres, the
non-legal-parent party would know who is raising their biological children
and may potentially see the legal parent party or the children in their
everyday life.289 Therefore, there is a potential moral dilemma if the
person becomes aware that his or her children are in an unsafe or
unhealthy situation.290 Additionally, since spouses are often part of the
same social circle, it is likely that family members and social contacts
would be around the child and know information about the child.291
Even though Arizona created a framework with predictable results
through its legislation, Arizona abandoned the three approaches already
in existence. An analysis that only considers the potential life of the
embryo is not an approach that should become widespread.
CONCLUSION
There are some serious problems with the contract approach;
however, enacting heightened contract standards can provide the
protections for the parties necessary to make it the best approach for states
forced to make such a decision. Strictly enforcing contracts without
proper protections for the parties in place can result in inequitable results.
Parties may not understand the rights they are implicating when they sign

286. Id. See also Uniform Parentage Act, §§ 706–07 (2017) (containing a similar
provision to limit the legal obligations to parties who oppose the implantation of contested
embryos).
287. See Cha, supra note 29. The state senator who introduced the bill stated that most
people believe the embryos deserve a chance at life, which suggests that the intention for
instituting this legislation was more grounded in an overall pro-life policy rather than addressing
the situations of the individual couples. Id. The chair of the American Bar Association’s
committee on fertility technology believes the legislation to be flawed because it is an endaround to establish the personhood of embryos—an important goal of anti-abortion
campaigners. Id. The potential ramifications for abortion law that may be caused by embryo
decisions and law are outside the purview of this Note.
288. Cha, supra note 29.
289. Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 272, at 26.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 27.
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the contract.292 Some may not realize until it is too late, and there is
nothing that the party can do to actively withdraw his or her consent from
the contract. However, if states were to pass legislation or decide through
case law that embryo contracts should be governed by a heightened
contract standard, then it should alleviate all these concerns. The majority
of states have not had a case that required them to select an approach, but
it is likely that more states will encounter this problem in the coming
years. This Note urges states that are encountering a case of first
impression to seriously contemplate the problems with the contract
approach unless there are additional protections in place. This approach,
as it stands, does not allow for the court to disregard the agreement when
the facts prevent enforcement from being the equitable result.293
The best approach for states to adopt is a contract standard with
additional protections and required criteria, similar to a prenuptial or
postnuptial agreement, or a surrogacy contract. If the fertility clinic
contract does not have the necessary protections and requirements, or if
the application of the contract creates an unconscionable result, then the
court should apply a balancing of interests test. This should be a balancing
of interests test that puts heavy weight on the wishes of the parties at the
time the embryos were created. This would still allow for the enforcement
of the clinic contract in all cases except the ones that have extreme facts
and circumstances. Such an approach would create exceptions for the
parties who have no other way to have children so that they still have the
ability to do so. This would also mean that in the vast majority of cases,
parties could not be forced into being parents against their wishes.
The best approach may be that the state legislatures begin proactively
enacting statutes. These statutes can provide the requirements and
protections for enforceable embryo disposition contracts. The absence of
a preexisting statutory scheme may result in a situation like Arizona, in
which people had a strong emotional reaction about the wife who lost her
only opportunity to have children after her cancer treatment.294 It tore at
people’s heartstrings and resulted in the passing of a new statute that
requires the judge to award the embryos to whichever parent was more
likely to bring the embryo to term as a baby.295 It remains unknown what

292.
293.
294.
295.

See supra Part II.
See id.
See generally Cha, supra note 29.
Id.
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unintended consequences could result from this emotion-based legislation
and whether such a statute will withstand constitutional review.296
If states are proactive in enacting statutes providing requirements for
these embryo disposition forms, then there would be set defenses to defeat
the contracts in cases where there are agreements and guidance for the
judiciary in cases where there is no preexisting agreement. As a direct
result of clear guidelines, consent forms would be forced to evolve to be
consistent with the requirements of these statutes, similar to the current
state of prenuptial agreements.297 Just as parties and their counsel ensure
that their prenuptial agreements are consistent with the statutory
requirements for enforceability, clinics would have to ensure that their
embryo agreements meet the heightened contract standards. Parties would
also be encouraged to seek independent legal counsel regarding these
agreements. These additional protections would maintain the selfdirecting nature of the contract approach and also temper the criticisms of
this approach.

296. See generally Catherine Wheatley, Note, Arizona’s Torres v. Terrell and Section
318.03: The Wild West of Pre-Embryo Disposition, 95 IND. L. J. 299 (2020).
297. See supra Part II.

